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Abstract 
Industrialization has long been seen as the answer to underdevelopment and poverty. First this 
led countries to follow protectionist import substitution policies but as these failed developing 
countries have opened up to trade and FDI and tried to follow strategies of export driven 
industrialization. If we consider the share of non-OECD countries in global trade in 
manufactures, this has been a big success. But has it? Developed countries still retain their 
competitive advantage in the innovative and fast growing industries of the future and for every 
success story in Asia there are at least two tales of woo in Africa. In this paper we present a two 
region product life cycle model of global specialization and trade. In it we analyse the impact of 
three major shocks to the gradually globalizing and integrating world economy and show that 
these shocks have caused a transition in the global specialization pattern. The advanced and 
previously industrialized countries have arguable made the transition to an entrepreneurial 
economy in which innovation, creativity and high value added in early stage activity are the basis 
of competitive advantage, whereas the developing world by-and-large has absorbed mature 
industrial activities based on the Heckscher–Ohlinian competitive advantage based on cheap 
unskilled labour. The key exogenous shocks that have led to this shift are the collapse of 
communism, the introduction of information and communication technologies and the opening 
up of large, populous developing countries such as India, China, and Brazil. Our model 
predictions are very much in line with observed trends in developing and developed economies 
and as such provides insights in the possible underlying mechanisms at work. 
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1 Introduction 
Globalization and technical change have been identified as key sources of structural change in 
industrialized and developing countries alike (e.g. Grossman and Helpman 1991; Helpman 
1998). At the same time both trends can be understood as the outcome of economic processes 
rather than exogenous to the global economic system. That begs the question what fundamental 
economic mechanisms may underlie the interaction between globalization, technical innovation, 
and structural change. The purpose of this paper is to address that question. We do so by 
analysing the impact of three important shocks to the global economy that have occurred since 
the 1980s. 
 
Arguably, the fall of communism in essence caused an exogenous global reduction in political 
risks and allowed large low skilled labour abundant economies to join the global economy 
(Audretsch 2007). This opening up of opportunities for economic integration coincided with the, 
also exogenous, introduction of a new general purpose technology (GPT) in the form of 
information and communication technologies (ICT) over the past 25 years (Helpman 1998).  
In this paper we argue that this combination of shocks caused the developed economies to make 
the transition from an industrial to an entrepreneurial economy in response to new opportunities; 
moreover, the entrepreneurs in the developed countries changed the pattern of national and 
international specialization in such a way that the developed countries experience wage 
divergence among skill groups and increase the share of new, knowledge-intensive products and 
services in their economy. This corresponds with observed transition to the ‘knowledge 
economy’ and the ‘rise of the creative class’ that has been well established in the literature 
(Florida 2003).  
 
Through outsourcing and FDI the developing and emerging economies on the other hand 
increasingly engage in the production of mature industrial goods (manufactures) and compete on 
the basis of their (static) comparative advantage, that is low wages. These countries enter the 
industrial era, but based on technology transfer that is largely initiated by international 
entrepreneurs.  
 
It is quite clear from the empirical literature (e.g. Keller 1996) that not all countries make that 
transition equally successfully and that for example absorptive capacity is a key in attracting and 
benefiting from the existing international entrepreneurship. In addition, local entrepreneurs and 
firms in developing and emerging economies also seize new opportunities and engage in export 
(one might call that ‘insourcing’) or even initiate FDI themselves. Moreover, as countries 
develop, they can be expected to move from agricultural self-sufficiency with abundant low 
skilled labour, to industrial export-oriented with increasing levels of human capital to an 
entrepreneurial and services-oriented mature economy with skilled labour and sophisticated 
demand. In this paper, however, we choose to limit ourselves to analysing the world as if it 
consisted of two regions. One advanced region that produces advanced early stage innovative 
products and one developing region that produces routine, mature standardized products. We like 
to stress at this point that this simplification is not intended to be a statement about the world as 
it is but rather is a useful abstraction that allows us to zoom in on the mechanism we are 
primarily interested in.  
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To outline our basic argument we build on elements from life cycle trade models as in Krugman 
(1979) and Grossman and Helpman (1991), models of endogenous skill biased technical change 
as in Acemoglu (2002b) and Sanders (2005) and notions from the large literature on the 
entrepreneurial function surveyed by for example Audretsch and Acs (2005).  
 
Our model shows how globalization and technological innovation drive the structural shift 
towards the entrepreneurial economy in the advanced region, but entrepreneurs in turn may drive 
the process of globalization and GPT exploration, both in the advanced and developing 
economy. We conclude from our analysis that the opening up and exploitation of opportunities 
for trade and GPT related products and services may have hurt especially the low skilled workers 
in advanced economies, but globalization through reduced political risks in the emerging 
countries unambiguously benefited all workers in both regions. 
 
In the remainder of this paper we first offer the data and evidence from the literature that 
underlie the stylized facts we intend to explain: the rise of an industrial economy in (parts of) the 
developing world, the shifting patterns of international specialization, the shift in aggregate 
labour demand in the advanced countries and finally the rise of an entrepreneurial economy 
there. This section also presents the evidence in support of some key assumptions in our model, 
notably the product life cycle and the role of international entrepreneurs in actively relocating 
mature production activities to developing countries. Section 2 also establishes the coincidence 
of exogenous shocks we offer as the catalyst for these developments. Section 3 presents our 
arguments in a formal model, Section 4 analyses the implications and concludes.  
2 Stylized facts 
2.1 Political risk, global labour supply, and a new general purpose technology 
Globalization and the advent of new ICT technology cannot reasonably be considered in 
isolation. It is obvious that the spectacular drop in the price of communication has been 
instrumental in allowing firms to expand their operations globally. It is also more than 
reasonable to assume that the development of ICT technology has benefited greatly from the 
boom in international demand for goods and services in general.  
 
Globalization, however, would not have occurred to the degree that it has if the fundamental 
changes were restricted to the advent of the microprocessor and telecommunications. During the 
post-war era most trade and economic investment was confined to Europe and North America, 
and later a few of the Asian countries, principally Japan and the Asian Tigers. Technology alone 
could not have overthrown that, largely political, constellation. Trade with countries behind the 
iron curtain was restricted and in some cases prohibited. Even trade with Japan and other Asian 
and South American countries was highly regulated. Similarly, investments in politically 
unstable countries resulted in episodes of national takeovers and confiscation where the foreign 
investors lost all or part of their investments.  
 
We therefore argue that it took a political revolution in significant parts of the world to reap the 
full benefits of these technological changes. The political counterpart of the technological 
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revolution was the increase in democracy and concomitant stability in areas of the world that had 
previously been inaccessible. As Thurow (2002: 25–26) pointed out, ‘Much of the world is 
throwing away its communist or socialist inheritance and moving towards capitalism. 
Communism has been abandoned as unworkable (China), imploded (the USSR), or has been 
overthrown (Central and Eastern Europe)’. Figure 1 illustrates this global political revolution by 
showing countries switching from one party (light shaded) or communist regimes (medium 
shaded) to liberal democracies (dark shaded) between 1950 and 2000. 
 
The ‘victory’ of democracy and capitalism over communism also provoked a renewed 
commitment to the principles of free trade and international competition in countries such as 
India and Brazil. India, for example, became accessible as a trading and investment partner after 
opening its economy in the early 1990s. With some of these areas (re)joining the world economy 
for the first time in decades, the post-war equilibrium came to a sudden end. 
 
What most distinguished the new players in the global economy was their relative abundance in 
cheap labour with comparatively low levels of education and productivity. For example, in the 
early part of the 1990s, the daily earnings of labour were estimated to be US$92.24 in the United 
States and US$78.34 in the European Union.  
 
Figure 1: The Rise of democracy 
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Figure 2: Share in global active population in 2005 
 
Source: ILO (2005). Available at: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/portal/index.html 
This stood in sharp contrast to wages of only US$6.14 in Poland and US$6.45 in the Czech 
Republic shortly after the Berlin Wall fell. With Asia, the wage gap was even greater, as daily 
earnings were USUS$1.53 in China, USUS$2.46 in India and USUS$1.25 in Sri Lanka. Where 
previously trade barriers and political control kept their economies disconnected and allowed 
such disparity to persist, China and India alone now account for over one third of the world’s 
active population.  
 
We thus establish Fact 1: Globalization is characterized by the entry of large populous low 
wage economies  
 
The potential labour force in countries like China, with 1.3 billion and India with 1.1 billion 
inhabitants dwarfs the population and workforce in North America and Europe. The global 
economic system thus had to deal with a sudden expansion of the supply of cheap manual labour. 
In any market economy the response to such a shock is predictable. In the incumbent players’ 
economies the wages decline for the jobs such workers can do and rise in complementary 
occupations (including the production of non-tradables). In addition, following standard 
Heckscher–Ohlin trade theory, one expects a shift in international trade patterns and increasing 
standards of living in the new entrant countries. The data over the past 10 years show all these 
trends.  
 
But globalization is certainly not all ‘bad news’ for the North. The political revolution created 
opportunities for entrepreneurs associated with the gaping labour cost differences and the 
emerging markets for their products. As long as the Wall stood, and countries such as China and 
Vietnam remained closed, the large discrepancies in wage rates could be maintained without 
eliciting responses in trade and FDI.  
 
Trade with and certainly direct investment by foreign companies was simply prohibited by local 
governments or considered to be too risky.  
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Figure 3: FDI outflow in % GDP 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2003). 
Figure 4: FDI inflow in % GDP 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2003). 
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Figure 5: Returns on US foreign assets 
 
Source: Data taken from Lane and Milesi-Feretti (2003), figure 10: 31. 
With opening up to trade and FDI these countries allow Northern entrepreneurs to step in and 
arbitrage away such differentials by outsourcing and off-shoring, making good money in the 
process.1  
 
The political shift also had a huge impact on global business opportunities. As can be verified in 
Figures 3 and 4 volumes of FDI increased rapidly between 1990 and 2000. Meanwhile one can 
verify in Figure 5 that the rate of return and yield on foreign assets fell between 1983 and 2001 
(by 8 and 3 basis points on average per year, respectively), indicating a drop in risk premia as 
Western investors apparently were willing to invest larger amounts at lower rates of return.  
 
And we establish fact 2: Political risks declined worldwide  
The Northern entrepreneurs were aided and facilitated in setting up such operations by the 
recently developed information and communications technologies that virtually destroyed 
distance and provoked serious reorganization of production in itself. This new GPT predates the 
fall of the Wall but the North was still in the middle of exploring and realizing its full potential 
when political events added an international dimension to the exploration process and provided 
new and highly profitable opportunities for application. It is well-established that ICT can be 
considered a GPT (in fact the concept was developed with ICT in mind by Bresnahan and 
Trajtenberg 1995).  
 
                                                 
1
 Outsourcing refers to placing parts of the production chain out of the firm and does not necessarily cross 
international borders. Off-shoring refers to placing (parts of) the firms activities abroad but maintaining control.   
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As Figure 6 illustrates, by 2000 most OECD countries have over 40 per cent of their workforce 
using computers.  
Figure 6: PCs per 100 white-collar workers 
 
Source: OECD (2005).  
Its rapid introduction in all aspects of the Northern way of life cannot have escaped anyone but 
the smallest infants and most senile senior citizens. Obviously, by ‘destroying distance’ this 
technology was particularly effective in reducing the costs of global operations.  
 
This establishes the third fact: ICT technology is a pervasive GPT 
 
We conclude that the drop in political risk, the expansion of the low skilled labour force in the 
South and the introduction of a new GPT are the fundamental exogenous events that triggered 
structural change in the last quarter of the 20th century. They all created new opportunities for 
Northern entrepreneurs to the extent that they took a leading role in shaping global production 
and trade. Their response to these new opportunities is what effectuated the changes we set out to 
explain. Before proceeding with modelling their role, however, we first establish those changes 
as empirically relevant facts in North and South. 
2.2 Shifting international specialization and the industrial economy in the South (East) 
A first indication of changing patterns of global economic activity is given by the more 
traditional measures of transnational activity. These traditional measures include trade (exports 
and imports), FDI (inward), international capital flows, and inter-country labour mobility. The 
overall trend for all of these measures has been strongly positive.  
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Figure 7: Share of exports in world GDP 
 
Source: Data taken from Torres (2001), figure 1: 11. 
Both exports and imports have become more important and accounted for a greater share of 
economic activity. Total world exports increased from US$1.3 trillion in 1970 to nearly US$5 
trillion in 2000, in constant dollars and exports have increased their share in total output 
consistently since 1820 (Torres 2001: table 1), but as Figure 7 shows also accelerates since the 
60s.2 Exports matter absolutely, relatively and increasingly.   
 
Of course higher total exports could simply be more of the same products by the same players 
crossing more borders. But this is not the case. The economic structure has fundamentally 
changed over the past 25 years in the developing South. Where the South previously relied on 
local production, agricultural, and natural resources exports while importing most manufactures, 
they now increasingly compete for a share in the global manufactures and even services markets. 
Especially in South-East Asia, where land/labour ratios are low, manufacturing, not agriculture 
and/or mining is the key sector of economic growth. Mayer and Wood (1999) predicted that the 
large economies of China and India would grow towards manufacturing shares between 70–80 
per cent of exports and by the mid nineties these countries had already reached those levels. 
China and India are by far the most impressive examples of rapid industrialization in the region 
but as OECD (2005) shows the overall non-OECD share in world trade and manufactures is 
increasing steadily.  
 
A closer look at the data shows that it is especially intermediate industrial products from South-
East Asia that are responsible for this upward trend (see WTO 2005 and Feenstra and Hanson 
2004). In several countries in South-East Asia and some in South America, industrial 
employment and output shares rose as a result of this outsourcing wave and by the turn of the last 
                                                 
2
 Longer time series show a stagnant period in the Interbellum (1918–39) and First and Second World War for 
well-known and obvious reasons. The export share in 1913 was 8.7 per cent and in 1950 stood at 7 per cent of 
global GDP. 
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century various industrialization processes have gained momentum to the point that it is fair to 
speak of emerging industrial societies.  
Figure 8: FDI inflow in % GFCF 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2003). 
In Taiwan and South Korea for example, employment in agriculture has dropped to around 10 
per cent, a level comparable to that of New Zealand today and half that of the Netherlands in 
1950. The large populous economies in the East are also rapidly industrializing and with over 50 
per cent of the workforce still in agriculture have a huge industrial labour reserve yet to absorb. 
Evidence presented by Antras (2005) suggests that Northern investors and entrepreneurs played a 
vital role in fueling these waves of industrialization.3 International flows of capital and in 
particular of FDI towards these new kids on the industrialized block have exploded since the late 
1980s and increasingly substituted for domestic savings as a source of gross fixed capital 
formation (GFCF).  
 
In general it is fair to say that the rise of industrial production in the South, at least in its initial 
stages, was actively promoted by actions of economic agents from the North.  
 
We thus establish fact 4: Northern Entrepreneurs fueled South-(East)-ern industrialization 
2.3 Shifting labour demand and the entrepreneurial economy in the North 
In the North, meanwhile, traditional industrial employment in large industrial firms has been 
falling as production was relocated. However, overall employment and output have still grown, 
mainly due to small firm job creation in ICT related services. The well-known transition towards 
the services economy is clearly illustrated in Figure 8.  
                                                 
3
 Antras (2005) offers an incomplete contract model to explain why northern firms and entrepreneurs, rather than 
southern imitators are the main initiator and vehicle of international technology transfer. 
14 
Figure 9: Employment shares in 17 OECD countries 
 
Source: Data were taken from Iversen and Rosenbluth (2006), figure 4: 29. 
In particular the widening gap between industry and services since 1970 indicates an 
unprecedented labour reallocation. Arguably for the first time in a time span that is considerably 
shorter than the average career, making life long employment a rarity and firm and industry 
specific skills a more risky investment than before.  
 
A closely related phenomenon is the rapid increase in the knowledge intensity of production, 
both in industry and services in the North. The trends away from low skilled manufacturing in 
OECD labour markets have been well-documented indeed (Katz and Autor 1999; Juhn et al. 
1993; Gottschalk and Moffit 1994; Goldin and Katz 2001; Nickell and Bell 1996; and Acemoglu 
2002a). Figure 9 shows how relative wages have been decreasing in the United States for low 
skilled workers in spite of strong increases in the average educational level, suggesting massive 
relative demand shifts away from low skilled labour.  
 
Figure 10: Relative wage and supply US 1967–2000 
 
Source: Card and DiNardo (2002).   
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A similar demand trend, even if wage changes were often less dramatic, has been identified for 
virtually every OECD country (see for example Autor et al. (2005) for recent evidence on the US 
and Machin and Van Reenen (1998) or Sanders and ter Weel (2000) for surveys of the evidence 
on the OECD).  
 
For example Autor et al. (1998) showed that the use of new technology, particularly new ICT 
related technologies, was highly correlated with the drop in unskilled labour demand. The link 
between technology and labour demand was further explored empirically by Berman et al. 
(1994), Machin and van Reenen (1998), Krusell et al. (2000) and Doms et al. (1997).  
 
Models to explain the technology-skilled labour–demand nexus can be found in Acemoglu 
(2002b) and Sanders (2005). Acemoglu attributes skill biases in technical change to the market 
size effect, which claims that technology was designed to be using skilled labour because the 
skilled labour supply increased in the 1970s. Sanders on the other hand claims, in accordance 
with Schultz (1961) that technology is skill biased by nature when it is new.  
 
This is the essence of a life cycle model and the evidence seems to support the latter type of 
model. Greenwood and Uysal (2004) make the case compellingly. The number of firms per 
capita and trademarks granted has exploded over the 1980s in the US. Kortum and Lerner (1997) 
show a similar speed-up in patenting and most activity obviously takes place in the new 
technology fields such as biotech and software. All this increased activity indicates high levels of 
grassroots entrepreneurship and product innovation, which in Greenwood (1997) but also in life 
cycle models causes temporary shifts in the relative demand for skilled labour. 
 
Another strand of literature, e.g., Caroli and van Reenen (2001), Bresnahan et al. (2002) would 
focus more on the effects of technology through the organization of work, rather than on 
characteristics of the new technologies per se. According to their evidence, the activities within 
firms have shifted towards design, sales, marketing, etc. whereas production itself was gradually 
automated, outsourced, or even off-shored.  
 
Piva et al. (2005) find evidence of a mutually reinforcing effect. In a recent and careful re-
evaluation of the evidence for the USA, Autor et al. (2005) conclude that technology and 
organizational change tend to ‘polarize’ the demand for labour.4 It is the intermediate level 
workers that are being replaced by technology.  
 
Meanwhile changing trade patterns also affected the North. The trade of goods tripled between 
1985 and 1996 while the trade of services increased by more than three times over this time 
period. While some of this increase in the world export rate is attributable to an increased 
participation in international trade by countries, which had previously been excluded, export 
rates in the leading industrialized countries have also increased over the past three decades. For 
example, US exports and imports have increased from 11 per cent of GDP in 1970 to more than 
                                                 
4
 It is likely that the evidence for skill polarization is less pronounced in the European welfare states, where a large 
low skilled service sector is absent and skill levels tend to be higher for the least educated. 
16 
25 per cent by 1999. 5 Exports as a share of GDP for 49 other developed countries have risen 
from around 18 per cent in 1982 to around 25 per cent by 1999.  
 
Evidence, collected by Feenstra and Hanson (1996; 1999; 2004), shows that over the 1980s and 
1990s the import of intermediate (manufactured) goods has almost doubled from 6.5 to 11.6 per 
cent of total intermediate purchases in the US. More open economies are likely to show much 
higher levels and similar increases.   
 
The increase in world trade is also not attributable to the influence of just a few industries or 
sectors, but rather systematic across most parts of the economy. The exposure to foreign 
competition in manufacturing increased by about one-sixth in the OECD countries. The exposure 
to foreign competition increased in every single OECD country, with the exception of Japan. In 
addition, it increased in most of the manufacturing industries.  
 
The way we read the evidence is that globalization combined with technological change, and in 
particular the information technology and communication technologies breakthroughs, had 
rendered the comparative advantage in low technology and even traditional moderate technology 
industries incompatible with high wage levels. At the same time, the emerging comparative 
advantage that is compatible with high wage levels is based on innovative and knowledge-
intensive activities. There are many indicators reflecting the shift in the comparative advantage 
of the high wage countries towards an increased importance of such activities. For example, the 
ICT sector of the USA has experienced an increase in the annual growth rate from 5 per cent in 
1991 to nearly 20 per cent by 1998. By contrast, the rest of the economy experienced fairly 
steady growth at around 3 per cent over this period. Before we turn to the role of the 
entrepreneur in this ‘new’ economy we establish fact 5: 
 
Fact 5: The North has experienced de-industrialization and a changing relative labour 
demand towards skilled non-production workers 
 
Increased globalization of economic activity seemingly also condemned entrepreneurship, in the 
form of new firm start-ups and small firms, to extinction. Or at least there seemed to be only an 
even more diminished role than in the capital driven Solowian Industrial Economy. Caves (1982: 
53) argued that the additional costs of globalization that would be incurred by small business 
‘constitute an important reason for expecting that foreign investment will be mainly an activity 
of large firms’. Certainly the empirical evidence by Horst (1972) showed that even after 
controlling for industry effects, the only factor significantly influencing the propensity to engage 
in FDI was firm size. As Chandler (1990: 130) concluded, ‘to compete globally you have to be 
big’. Thus, it was particularly startling and a seeming paradox, when scholars first began to 
document that what had seemed like the inevitable demise of entrepreneurship actually began to 
reverse itself starting in the 1970s. 
 
Loveman and Sengenberger (1991) and Acs and Audretsch (1993) carried out systematic 
international studies examining the re-emergence of small firms and entrepreneurship in North 
America and Europe. Two major findings emerged from these studies. First, the relative role of 
                                                 
5
 ‘Markets Go Global’, The Economist, 20 September, 1997. 
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small firms varies systematically across countries, and secondly, in most European countries and 
in North America, small firms began increasing their relative importance starting in the mid-
1970s. In the USA the average real GDP per firm increased by nearly two-thirds between 1947 
and 1980, from US$150,000 to US$245,000, reflecting a trend towards larger enterprises and a 
decreasing importance of small firms. However, within the subsequent seven years, by 1987, it 
had fallen by about 14 per cent to US$210,000 (Brock and Evans 1989). Similarly, small firms 
accounted for one-fifth of manufacturing sales in the USA in 1976, but by 1986 the small firm 
share of sales had risen to over one-quarter (Acs and Audretsch 1990).  
 
It was in the area of job generation that the recent emergence of entrepreneurship was first 
identified. In 1981 David Birch revealed the startling findings from his long term study of US 
job generation. Birch (1981: 8) found that, ‘Whatever else they are doing, large firms are no 
longer the major providers of new jobs for Americans’. Instead, he discovered that most new 
jobs emanated from small firms. More recently, Davis et al. (1996a; 1996b) corrected for the 
regression to the mean fallacy which they claim is inherent in Birch’s results. While their 
quantitative results differ from Birch’s, their study still indicates that small firms account for 
more than their share of new employment. In particular, in their study large firms created 53 per 
cent of the new jobs but their employment share is 65 per cent. At the same time, large firms 
destroyed 56 per cent of the jobs, which is greater than their share of new jobs created. Their 
measure was static in nature and gave no indication whether this share has been increasing or 
decreasing over time. Still the results indicate that small firms are net job generators, while large 
firms shed labour. 
 
The rise in entrepreneurial activity is not particular to the US. The changes in employment shares 
in Europe are telling. The small firm employment share in manufacturing in the Netherlands 
increased from 68.3 per cent in 1978 to 71.8 per cent in 1986; in the United Kingdom from 30.1 
per cent in 1979 to 39.9 per cent by 1986; in (West) Germany from 54.8 per cent in 1970 to 57.9 
per cent by 1987; in Portugal from 68.3 per cent in 1982 to 71.8 per cent in 1986; in the North of 
Italy from 44.3 per cent in 1981 to 55.2 per cent by 1987, and in the South of Italy from 61.4 per 
cent in 1981 to 68.4 per cent by 1987 (Acs and Audretsch 1993). An EIM study documents how 
the relative importance of SMEs in Europe (19 countries), measured in terms of employment 
shares has continued to increase between 1988 and 2001 (EIM 2002).  
 
Methodologies similar to Birch’s were also used in the European context to assess the 
contribution to new job generation. In one of the first studies Gallagher and Stewart (1986) and 
Storey and Johnson (1987) found similar results for the United Kingdom. Konings (1995) linked 
gross job flows in the United Kingdom to establishment size and finds that the gross job creation 
rate is the highest in small establishments and the lowest in large establishments. By contrast, the 
gross job destruction rate is the lowest in small establishments and the highest in large 
establishments. 
 
Evidence from Sweden (Heshmati 2001) also suggests that employment creation is negatively 
related to firm size based on data from the 1990s. Similarly, Hohti (2000) finds that gross 
employment creation and destruction are negatively related to firm size in Finland. Using data 
from Finnish manufacturing between 1980–94, Hohti (2000) finds that the annual job flow rates, 
in terms of births and deaths, is similar to that identified by Broesma and Gautier (1997: 216) for 
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Dutch manufacturing firms and by Klette and Mathiassen (1996) for Norwegian manufacturing 
firms. In particular, new establishments have the greatest job creation rates as well as the greatest 
rates of job destruction. Thus, the evidence from Finland, as well as from Sweden, and the 
Netherlands, suggests entrepreneurial dynamics similar to those found in North America. 
Hence, the weight of the empirical evidence on employment generation is remarkably robust and 
indicates that the role of entrepreneurship in employment generation in Europe is consistent with 
the findings for the United States. The reversal of the trend towards large enterprises and the re-
emergence of small firms were not limited to employment only. For example, in the Netherlands 
the business ownership rate fell during the post-war period, until it reached a trough of 0.085 in 
1982. But this downward trend was subsequently reversed, rising to a business ownership rate of 
0.10 by 1998 (Audretsch et al. 2002).  
 
Small and new enterprises are therefore increasingly important qualitatively, as a mode of 
organization and operation, and quantitatively as an engine of employment creation on both sides 
of the Atlantic. In addition it should be emphasized that an important qualification of the ‘Job 
Generation’ literature, is that it only links employment changes of the firm to the size and in 
some cases the age of the firm. This means that the performance criterion is not focused on 
aggregate employment changes, but employment changes at the level of the firm. This implicitly 
assumes that there is no externality or spillover from one enterprise to other firms. At this point 
we feel confident to state fact 6: 
 
Fact 6: Entrepreneurial activity has risen 
 
And with this fact we complete our list of facts to explain and be explained in the model we 
develop in the next section. Section 2.4 wraps up this section first. 
2.4 Summary 
This section has established the facts we intend to explain and those we intend to use as 
explanation. We intend to explain how political liberalization and technology have interacted and 
offered the Northern entrepreneurs the opportunities they needed to transform trade and 
production patterns and shape what we know as globalization and the knowledge economy.  
 
We have shown that: 
1. Labour abundant countries have joined the global economic system 
2. Political risk has declined in the world 
3. Information and Communication Technologies is a General Purpose Technology that 
fuels globalization. 
4. Arguably, these developments are exogenous to the economic system we consider. 
Starting from these observations we speculated that they may cause: 
5. FDI driven industrialization in the South(East) 
6. De-industrialization and shifting relative labour demand in the North 
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7. Increased entrepreneurial activity in innovation, outsourcing, and off-shoring. 
The next section presents a model where the link between cause and effect is formalized.  
3 The model 
Aspects involving the decision to locate production in foreign countries are certainly not a new 
subject and have been studied in the context of so called product life cycle models since Vernon 
coined the term in 1966. He linked the location of production activities to the life cycle stage of 
the product, hypothesizing that new products, because of their higher knowledge intensity, would 
be produced in the North, that has a relative abundance of skilled labour and therefore a 
comparative advantage in their production. Krugman (1979) formalized Vernon’s idea in a 
model but assumed that technology generation and transfer are both exogenous processes. 
Grossman and Helpman (1991) used the insights of endogenous growth theories to endogenize 
the process of innovation and imitation. In these models, however, no distinction is made 
between skilled and unskilled labour. Moreover, Grossman and Helpman are also not explicit 
about the role of Northern agents in initiating the transfer of technology across geographic space. 
Instead they assume that R&D undertaken in the South drives technology diffusion by copying 
ideas off the shelve from the North.  
 
In this tradition we now present a model that distinguishes among three stages in the life cycle of 
products. The first stage is initiated by the discovery of a new product. Upon discovery, an 
entrepreneur in the North will introduce the new product or service into the Northern economy. 
The second stage occurs when the product matures, leading the incumbent firm to apply firm-
based R&D to the standardization and routinization of the production process, driven by the 
desire to cut costs. As the production process becomes standardized, less skilled workers in the 
North can then be engaged in the production process at relatively low wages. However, so can 
Southern workers. Still, we assume that the act of moving production abroad marks the 
beginning of a separate third and final stage in the product life cycle. Setting up production 
facilities in the South is neither costless nor riskless and requires an entrepreneurial act. We 
assume that a Northern entrepreneur initiates this process as copying behaviour is important 
especially after Northern entrepreneurs have set up shops in the South. We therefore assume that 
it is FDI, not Southern imitation R&D that will be the medium of knowledge spillover. 
 
By endogenizing the allocation of entrepreneurial talent over product innovation, process 
innovation, and outsourcing/off-shoring, we can explain the dynamics in global specialization 
patterns as the result of political risks falling and low skilled labour abundant countries joining 
the global economy. We also show that the introduction of a so called GPT drives the Northern 
economy further towards what we have coined the entrepreneurial economy above; a production 
structure that relies heavily on new goods production and product innovation for creating value 
added.  
 
The model structure follows that of a standard endogenous growth with variety expansion in a 
final goods model. First we assume identical time separable preferences globally and derive 
consumer demand for goods over time solving: 
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where E is expenditure on consumption, P is the price of a unit of direct utility, ρ is the discount 
rate, Y is income, A is the level of assets and a dot over a variable signifies the time derivative. 
This problem yields the familiar Ramsey result: 
ρrEE tt −=/&    (2) 
Then we assume a standard Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) love-of-variety instant 
utility function and solve: 
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i indexes a single good and n is the total number of goods consumed. c and p are quantity and 
price of a single good in the basket. To derive the instant global demand functions for all current 
and future goods in this CES-utility function is straightforward:6 
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P is defined as the minimum cost of one unit of direct utility, U.  
 
Now consider production. Following the life cycle literature we assume that products in their 
early stages can only be produced in the North. The reason is that early stage production requires 
high flexibility and creativity as well as frequent feedback from the consumer. Northern skilled 
workers and sophisticated consumers provide the required setting. All these early stage aspects 
give skilled workers a competitive advantage in production (Schultz (1961). As there is also a 
large tacit knowledge spillover required from inventor to innovator and early stage producer, it is 
reasonable to assume that a new product is initially produced by only skilled workers and only in 
the North.  
 
At that stage the producer therefore faces no competition, at home or abroad, allowing him to set 
monopoly prices: 
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6
 See for example Grossman and Helpman (1991). 
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where wNH is the high skilled wage in the North, l is the amount of labour employed. Note also 
that labour is the only factor of production and the production volume, y is assumed linear in 
labour employed. This yields: 
H
N
H
N
i bα
wp =                   HNnn ∈∀    (6) 
As a product matures the incumbent producer will invest in R&D to come up with a process that 
allows the product to be produced by low skilled workers in the North.7 This will reduce costs 
and hence increases profits. At the mature stage, however, the market will no longer be 
uncontested. The fired skilled workers can always set up a new firm and set their price equal to 
marginal costs:8 
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the incumbent, however, using the mature production technology, has lower marginal costs and 
can retain the entire market and prevent entry by setting his price equal to: 
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where ε is close to 0. However, the new production process also creates the possibility of 
outsourcing the production. To enable Northern low skilled workers to compete against the high 
skilled workers, production must be routinized and many routines are embedded into machines, 
interfaces, and procedures. Such codifications, however, can also be transferred (at some cost) 
abroad. The Northern producer must therefore now fear competition from abroad. His only edge 
is the potentially higher marginal productivity of Northern low skilled labour.9 If profitable entry 
from abroad is feasible the incumbent is not likely to engage in that activity. It typically takes an 
entrepreneur to set it up, take the risks and, if successful, reap the benefits. Products that have 
been outsourced have a price: 
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and in our model compete out production in the North entirely. For given n, nNH, nNL and nSL the 
labour markets for Northern skilled, unskilled and Southern labour can now be assumed to clear, 
such that the model equilibrates. We require: 
                                                 
7
 Note that in fact we assume that products only mature as the incumbent producer engages in such R&D. It is not 
an automatic process as for example in Krugman (1979) or Arrow (1962). 
8
 Here we have to assume they cannot as long as the firm employs them. Some non-disclosure agreements 
typically ensure that they do not infringe upon the incumbents profits while and even some time after being 
employed there.  
9
 In reality there is all kinds of competitive advantages. The Northern incumbent may enjoy lower transportation 
costs to the largest markets, protective tariffs and subsidies, complementary sectors, etc. etc. 
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  (10) 
Although this set of equations cannot be solved analytically, due to the discontinuities in the 
demand curves, one can analyse the equilibrium graphically and sequentially. First consider the 
market for high skilled workers in the North in the left panel. 
 
Figure 11: Labour market equilibrium 
 
Source: compiled by the authors. 
There is no competition in this market, implying that prices are always set to profit maximization 
levels and consequently the demand curve is continuous. Confronted with exogenous supply this 
yields an equilibrium wage at wNH*. Given that wage the marginal costs in the new goods sector 
are given by wNH*/b, which puts an upper limit on prices in the mature Northern sector. Beyond 
that price demand for goods falls to 0, so demand for labour falls to 0. Therefore the demand 
curve has a horizontal section at the low skilled wage that would imply a profit maximizing price 
is set equal to wNH*/b. This is the case at wNL= αwNH*. Then the kinked curve is confronted with 
exogenous supply and we obtain the Northern equilibrium low skilled wage. By similar 
argument one can also construct the demand for Southern low skilled labour and solve the final 
market. All labour markets equilibrate simultaneously for all given combinations of n, nNH, nNL 
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and nSL. n, nNH, nNL and nSL, however, will not be constant over time. The assumption of 
imperfect competition implies there are rents in the model and therefore there is an incentive for 
new entrants. Consider the effects on profit flows and ultimately the value of being a producer in 
the three stages of the life cycle. With prices set as above, there are four scenarios that we need 
to consider. The cost gaps between high and low skilled labour using producers in the North and 
between Northern and Southern low skilled labour using producers can be wide or narrow 
respectively. Hence profits for the three types of activity under these conditions are given in 
Table 1. The most important result in Table 1 is the fact that profits are always positive and in 
steady state equilibrium, where relative wages and relative sector sizes are constant, proportional 
to total expenditures and inversely proportional to their own sector size. Given these profit flows 
it is therefore worthwhile to engage in entrepreneurial activity, product development, and 
outsourcing/off-shoring.10  
                                                 
10
 Obviously it is worthwhile only if the discounted present value of this profit flow exceeds the costs of making 
the required innovation. 
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Table 1 
Profits under various scenarios 
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Entrepreneurial activity introduces new goods and services into the economy. Product 
development allows existing products to be produced by low skilled labour in the North and 
outsourcing moves the production of routinized products to the South. Even if patents are 
perfectly enforced, such activities are worthwhile, as the flow of profit increases with each stage 
in the life cycle, as long as wNH > wNL > wSL. The incentive to move the product over the cycle 
then comes from increments in the profit flow. This also explains why incumbents may engage 
in (defensive) product development and outsourcing even though they cannibalize on their 
current profits.11 The incentive to become an innovating entrepreneur is the value of being a 
Northern uncontested new good producer that is given by: 
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the expected discounted profit flow from time t, the time of entry, to time T, the time at which 
production with low skilled labour starts and monopoly profits are contested, conditional on the 
information set I(t) available at time t. The flow probability of being contested is given by the 
relative gross number of product development, ( ) HNLSLN nnn /&& + . Expecting that profit grows at 
a constant rate, as it will in the steady state, yields: 
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An entrepreneur is able to capture this value by setting up a firm and starting production of a new 
good or service. Similarly we have for the Northern low skilled producers: 
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where the current profits are discounted by the rate of interest, r, the rate of profit erosion, ( )LNLN nnEE // && −−  and the risk of losing the profits because of outsourcing, LNLS nn /& . 
However, the value of a product development to the incumbent is lower. In order to obtain the 
higher profit flow an incumbent foregoes the existing profit flow. Hence the value of a product 
development equals the positive difference between (13) and (12). Finally the value of owning 
an outsourced firm that produces in the South is equal to: 
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where ψ is a risk premium for producing abroad that reflects the risks of being unable to retrieve 
profits and reflects the perhaps less than perfect property rights protection in the South.12 Once 
                                                 
11
 In fact we assume their cost advantage and tacit knowledge give them a sufficient edge, so we see only 
incumbent firms doing product development. 
12
 This is our parameter for political risk. 
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more the value to the incumbent and therefore also to any entrant that is forced to compensate 
him for patent infringement, equals the positive difference between (14) and (13).13  
Let us finally assume that introducing a new good or service, developing a product and 
outsourcing it all draw on the same pool of limited resources in the North, which we may label 
entrepreneurial talent, T.14 To close the model we must specify how entrepreneurial talent 
combines with accumulated knowledge to generate the dynamics in the model. Assume: 
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where 0≤γ≤1  (15) 
Note that a productivity parameter a and the amount of entrepreneurial talent allocated are 
combined with nA, nNH and nNL to reflect the knowledge spillovers in the model. Innovation 
benefits from the (exogenous) stock of knowledge, nA.15 Development benefits from the 
knowledge accumulated in new goods production, nNH, and outsourcing benefits from experience 
in routinized production, nNL. Furthermore (15) reflects the assumption that a product must first 
be invented, can then be routinized and finally outsourced, but only in that order, missing none 
of the stages in its development.  
 
Entrepreneurial talent now has to be allocated over three alternative uses. In each it must 
generate the same marginal value product. Assuming this (market clearing) reward to 
entrepreneurial talent is given by wT we obtain: ( ) ( )LNLSLNγOHNLNHNγDHNAγIT vvnaTγvvnaTγvnaTγw −=−== −−− 111   
  (16) 
This arbitrage condition can be rewritten in separate entrepreneurial talent demand equations that 
are downward sloping in the reward for entrepreneurial talent.16  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 Results do not change qualitatively and become stronger if we allow for entrepreneurs to not compensate 
incumbents. Obviously that makes outsourcing even more attractive. 
14
 Alternatively one could think of R&D labour, engineering talent, or organizational and managerial talents. All 
that is required to justify this assumption is that all innovative activities require the same labour that is a different 
type of labour than that used in production. 
15
 See Sanders (2005) for more details on how this knowledge parameter can be endogenized. In standard new 
growth models it is frequently assumed to be equal to n, accumulated innovation. In this model this would also 
introduce endogenous growth but prevent us from experimenting with shocks to the knowledge stock. The 
introduction of a new GPT, however, is exactly that, a positive shock to nA. 
16
 One could consider setting wT equal to the high skilled wage in the North as it arguably presents the opportunity 
costs for the entrepreneur. However, this complicates the model considerably without adding much in terms of 
insight in the mechanisms we are primarily interested in. Sanders (2005) shows the equivalence in qualitative 
results in a different (two stage life cycle) but closely related model. 
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Equating the sum to the total stock of entrepreneurial talent in the North yields the equilibrium 
reward for entrepreneurial activity: 
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 (17) 
which in steady state grows in proportion to nA times vNH. As the latter grows in proportion to 
profits, which in turn grow in proportion to expenditure, E, over nNH in the steady state the 
reward to entrepreneurial talent will grow in proportion to total expenditure, as will wages in all 
labour markets, as long as nA grows at the same rate as nNH. Normalization of expenditure then 
pins down the growth rate of all nominal variables in the model to 0. The total range of goods 
expands at the common growth rate of new, mature, and outsourced goods in the global 
economy. This leads to propositions I and II. 
 
Proposition I: There exists a steady state equilibrium in which the allocation of all labour types 
is stable, all ranges of goods grow at the common positive rate and labour markets are clear.  
 
Proposition II: This steady state is a unique and globally stable equilibrium in the sense that the 
economy will converge back to this steady state when it is disturbed by shocks. 
 
The proof for both propositions is in the Appendix. The dynamic equilibrium in the model can be 
illustrated by plotting the three demand equations for entrepreneurial activity, implicit in 
equation (16) and equating the vertical sum of these curves to the exogenous supply of 
entrepreneurial talent in the North. In the steady state these levels of activity must generate the 
same rate of expansion G*, to the respective variety ranges. The knowledge spillover structure 
assumed in equation (15), which implies all entrepreneurial activity receives a spillover from 
upstream entrepreneurial activity (which for innovation is exogenous knowledge creation), 
guarantees that in the end all variety ranges will grow at the same rate for a stable allocation of 
entrepreneurial talent. As was shown under Proposition II and in the Appendix this implies in the 
steady state the right panel of Figure 11 applies. 
 
Figure 12: Steady state equilibrium 
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Now consider the comparative statics in the steady state concerning the effects of increases in 
LSL, (globalization/integration), ψ (property rights/institutions) and nA (technology shock/GPT) 
and our policy experiment to encourage and stimulate entrepreneurship T* 
(education/entrepreneurship). To see what happens consider first the shocks in isolation.  
A sufficiently large increase in southern labour supply (if the shock is too small one may stay in 
a situation of narrow wage gap and relative profits do not change, causing no response) will 
initially drive down equilibrium wages in the South and push the southern economy out of a 
possible narrow gap situation. In Table 1 it can be seen that in that case profits in the South will 
rise as wages fall. By equation (14) that implies the value of outsourcing activities increases and 
entrepreneurs will switch out of innovation and development to outsource more mature products 
to the South. As the rate of outsourcing accelerates and the rates of innovation and development 
fall, there is a change in the relative composition of the economy. More varieties are produced in 
the South, variety expansion falls and both nNH and nNL will fall relative to nSL. This, by (10) 
implies that Southern wages recover and Northern wages will fall, whereas the reward to 
entrepreneurial talent rises. Of course equilibrium is re-established once diminishing returns in 
innovation, development and outsourcing (through the gradual reduction of upstream knowledge 
stocks) make sure all ranges grow at the same rate again. It should be noted here that the 
prediction that Southern wages fall and recover gradually does not apply for the countries that 
join world markets. They enter the market with wages below wSL and see an immediate rise 
followed by a further increase in the wage level. The predictions for Southern wage levels 
therefore rather apply to for example countries like Brazil, Mexico, and Egypt than India or 
China. 
 
The impact of a drop in political risk ψ enters our model directly in the return to outsourcing 
equation (14). Decreasing risk implies lower discount rates of given profits, making outsourcing 
more attractive to the entrepreneurs. The impact on the allocation of entrepreneurial talent and 
the relative composition of the economy is similar as above. However, there is no steady state 
reduction in Southern wages. Instead the wages rise due to the increased demand. In the North 
the implications for relative wages and income are similar as before. The entrepreneurs gain and 
the low skilled lose out most but also high skilled wages fall relative to Southern wages. 
 
A rise in the knowledge stock nA or the rate of knowledge expansion has a temporary or 
permanent effect on the steady state composition of the economy, respectively. If there is a level 
shock the benefits will dissipate gradually. The high skilled workers in the North benefit first. 
Entrepreneurs move into innovation and abandon development and outsourcing. As the available 
stock of new products expands, however, the entrepreneurs will return to development and 
ultimately outsourcing. The steady state has no changes so the economy will eventually return to 
its initial equilibrium. If the growth rate has increased permanently that implies that in the steady 
state all ranges of goods will grow at a higher rate, but also that the steady state size of the new 
product range will be larger. Consequently the high skilled in the North gain relative to the low 
skilled in North and South and again the entrepreneurs benefit. 
 
A rise in T* the stock of entrepreneurial talent/resources in the Northern economy, has a peculiar 
steady state impact in this model. The entrepreneurs will be allocated to expanding the three 
variety ranges and these ranges and all ranges will therefore expand faster for some time, but as 
the new and mature goods range are also eroded faster only the range of Southern varieties will 
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grow in the steady state. That generates the interesting result that the benefits of entrepreneurship 
training in general leak to developing countries. As entrepreneurs pass the buck, the buck moves 
faster to where it stops. However, one should realize that in passing the buck the entrepreneur 
appropriates part of the surplus with every pass. Entrepreneurial output thus increases and even 
though their wages fall, their incomes rise to the extent that Northern income increases relative to 
Southern income if demand elasticities are sufficiently low. One should also realize that the 
North is composed of many countries and any one Northern entrepreneur may take a mature 
good and outsource it. Having more entrepreneurs and fewer workers in your country puts you in 
a favorable position relative to the other Northern countries, not in the least because more 
entrepreneurs also means quicker adjustment to external shocks as the ones described above. 
From a global perspective more entrepreneurs are also unambiguously beneficial. It will reduce 
global wage if not income inequality and ensures faster adjustment to equilibrium when 
exogenous shocks hit the economy. As the world may still have to deal with such shocks in the 
future, the end of oil reserves, nuclear disaster in the Middle East, the recovery of Japan or the 
introduction of cold hydrogen fusion reactors. Whatever lays ahead, entrepreneurs can help deal 
with it and adjust as long as change opens up opportunities. 
 
Finally consider the effect of all shocks described above combined. As we argued in Section 1 
that is precisely what happened over the past 25 years. The model then predicts significant wage 
divergence in the North between the skilled and unskilled and certainly between the 
entrepreneurs and workers in general, increasing FDI and outsourcing to the South, and a 
widening of the North-South wage gap. The latter has not been observed in the data as China and 
India have always been considered part of the South but taking them out of the sample one sees 
significant divergence between OECD and non-OECD countries in both wage and income levels. 
China and India, on the other hand, are seen to quickly close the wage and income gap with the 
North and not surprisingly they receive the bulk of FDI outflow from the North as well. Lower 
political risk implies that the downward wage pressure in the (rest of) the South is somewhat 
ameliorated. Our policy experiment of increasing the entrepreneurial capabilities shows that self-
interested national policies may yet help to tip the scales and help close the North-South wage 
and income gaps while offering new perspectives for countries in the North to remain 
competitive among their peers in globalizing markets.  
4 Conclusions 
Globalization and technological change have triggered fundamental changes in both the 
developed and developing countries. This paper illustrates one mechanism through which these 
shocks interact. By opening up new opportunities for entrepreneurs new technology and a global 
market both create a dynamic that shifts the specialization pattern in the global economy. An 
important implication of our model is that developing countries are gaining the comparative 
advantage for economic activity in the latter stages of the product life cycle, where the classic 
factors of raw labour and physical capital play an important role. At the same time, globalization 
has facilitated a shift in comparative advantage in the advanced economies away from mature 
industries and towards economic activity in the early stage of the product life cycle. This 
reorientation towards early stage activity was reinforced by the simultaneous rise of a GPT that 
offers both the means for organizing off-shoring and outsourcing and presented entrepreneurs 
with many opportunities for new products and services. The coincidence of these trends caused 
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and forced the advanced countries to enter the entrepreneurial economy, whereas it allowed 
(some) developing countries to rapidly industrialize. Whether the emergence of the 
entrepreneurial economy is permanent or transitory depends upon the nature of globalization. It 
does not seem likely, however, based on the model presented in this paper, to expect a return to 
the industrial economy any time soon. The political turnaround we have identified as the 
exogenous shock driving globalization is not likely to be reversed. On the technology side, 
however, we do know that related new products and services will mature. The plight of the 
unskilled worker in the advanced economies may yet be ameliorated by his increased 
participation in these new industries. Under current global competitive conditions, however, it is 
more likely that these industries will also quickly transfer routine operations to less expensive 
regions and alternative employment may be required after all. 
 
The policy implications of our analysis are thus that developed countries’ governments should 
gear their labour market and social security policies to the new economic reality. Flexibility, 
mobility, and employability are key assets for workers and self-employed in the entrepreneurial 
economy. A large and easily accessible low skilled non-tradables sector such as personal services 
would have to be developed if welfare states are to survive this pressure. 
 
For the developing world the focus should gradually shift from attracting FDI inflows to building 
local capabilities and absorbing mature technologies. In the end, the transition to a developed 
country is possible, but to take-off a strategy of gradually moving upstream in the life cycles 
seems appropriate. Modern growth theory has little to offer for the situation they find themselves 
in. More R&D will not help regions and countries in which not even mature routine industrial 
activity has been developed. But governments should also realize that comparative and 
competitive advantages are temporary in nature and should not be protected against such 
dynamics. Stimulating local entrepreneurs to take advantage of the opportunities in global 
markets is the one policy that can be shown to deliver lasting advantages as, by their flexibility, 
these entrepreneurs can help adapt to possible future shocks as well as the current slump in 
global economic growth. 
 
Our model does not generate very detailed policy advice for either side but the general direction 
is clear and further research requires a fundamental understanding of these macroprocesses. In 
that understanding we hope to have contributed. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition I 
The proof follows from assuming this steady state exists and showing that it constitutes an 
equilibrium in all labour markets. First consider the markets for production labour. They clear iff 
the allocation satifies: 
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Taking growth rates on both sides implies: 
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where the latter constraints follows from the fact that relative wages appear in the expressions. 
From these conditions we can derive that in any steady state equilibrium wages must grow at the 
same rate and hence so must all sectors. This in turn implies in (15) that the number of firms in 
each sector must grow at the same constant rate as nA. 
 
Now consider the market for entrepreneurial talent. It clears when (17) holds. Under the 
conditions derived above, the reward to entrepreneurship can be shown to grow at rate: 
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This implies that, if relative wages are to be constant, all must grow at the same rate as total 
expenditures and (A2) reduces to: 
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If we then normalize expenditure to 1 growth rates of profits and consequently innovation values 
reduce to –g and the interest rate is endogenously determined by (2) to equal ρ. There is therefore 
a steady state equilibrium that is fully characterized by: 
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  (A5) 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition II 
Consider being out of equilibrium such that nNH/nNL>(nNH/nNL)SS. Then by Table 1 
π
N
H/πNL<(πNH/πNL)SS and consequently by (12)–(13) vNH/vNL<(vNH/vNL)SS which implies that 
TI<TISS and TD>TDSS such that gnn HNHN </& and gnn LNLN </& . Therefore we move towards 
the equilibrium as (15) then implies that nNH/nNL falls towards (nNH/nNL)SS. That process will end 
in the steady state. A similar argument can be made for all possible deviations from the steady 
state allocation of entrepreneurial activity, which proves that the steady state is both unique and 
stable.  
Q.E.D. 
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